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Abstract
Phase change memory (PCM) is emerging as a lead alternative to DRAM due to its good combination of speed, density,
energy, and reliability. However, PCM can endure far fewer overwrites than DRAM before wearing out. PCM is susceptible to
malicious or accidental overwrites which can wear out a frame in a few hundreds of seconds. Previous papers have proposed to
randomize periodically the address-to-frame mapping in a memory region. Each randomization involves remapping the region’s
memory blocks which incurs significant write overhead. To guarantee reasonable worst-case lifetimes, the papers assume that
every write overwrites the same memory block and incur either high write overhead for normal applications (i.e., the common
case), or permanent, high hardware overhead (i.e., in all cases). We make the key observation that the overwrite rates of normal
applications (i.e., common case) are orders-of-magnitude lower than that of the worst case. However, naively measuring the
overwrite rate using brute-force hardware would incur significant complexity and power. Instead, we apply basic statistical sam-
pling to estimate accurately the overwrite rate while requiring a small sampling buffer. Our approach, calledstatistical wear lev-
eling (SWL), whichrandomizes address-to-frame mapping on the basis of the estimated overwrite rates instead of write
rates.SWL achieves both lower common-case write overhead and lower hardware overhead, and similar, high common-case
lifetime as compared to the previous schemes while achieving reasonable worst-case lifetime.
1  Introduction
It is widely agreed that DRAM’s charge-based storage is not likely to scale beyond a few more technology gener-
ations (e.g., 20nm) [23]. Many alternative technologies such as spin torque transfer RAM (STTRAM) [28] and
phase-change memory (PCM) [21] are being considered to replace DRAM. PCM, which uses phase (crystalline ver-
sus amorphous) to store state, is emerging as a lead contender due to its good combination of energy, speed, density,
and reliability (wear) characteristics. While PCM is projected to scale in density well after when DRAM scaling
slows down, PCM poses its own challenges. Compared to DRAM, PCM incurs longer latency and provides lower
bandwidth (especially for writes) and can endure far fewer overwrites before wearing out (108 in PCM versus 1016 in
DRAM) [23]. Though device- and circuit-level optimizations will continue to improve PCM, PCM’s reliability and
performance will benefit from architectural and system support (e.g., [13][20][30]). In this paper, we focus on
improving PCM’s reliability.
The issue is wear-out of PCM due to overwriting of memory locations. Repeated over-writing can wear out a
memory frame in a few hundreds of seconds (e.g., if each write takes 1µs then 108 overwrites would take 100 s)
[19]. This over-writing may be maliciously intentional resulting in a security problem or unintentional leading to a
reliability problem [19]. Because of the speed at which the damage can occur irrespective of the cause of the over-
writes and because the damage results in permanent loss of memory capacity, the solution shouldguaranteegood
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reliability underworst-caseoverwrites. In the rest of the paper, we use the term “worst-case overwrites” without
specifying the cause.
While wear leveling for Flash is well-studied [27][12], Flash requires an erase before a write forcing every over-
write to remap the memory block to a new frame whereas PCM allows overwrites without any erases. Such remap-
ping involves migrating the block and incurs significant bandwidth and energy. Also, the erase and write
granularities are different in Flash, posing garbage collection challenges which do not exist in PCM. Thus, wear lev-
eling strategies for Flash are not a good fit for PCM. Some recent papers provide PCM wear-leveling solutions by
periodically randomizing the address-to-frame mapping in a memory region (e.g., 512 MB). To ensure that no mem-
ory frame is worn out severely before the next randomization, the schemes force a randomization after athreshold
number of writes to a region under the worst-case assumption the every write overwrites the same memory frame.
Each randomization involves remapping the region’s memory blocks which incurs significant write overhead and
consumes the already-scarce PCM write bandwidth, and energy. Though the remapping can be spread out over the
entire time between two consecutive randomizations, the bandwidth and energy overheads remain.
The write overhead can be reduced either (1) by increasing the write threshold per randomization and thereby
decreasing the number of randomizations, or (2) by shrinking the region so that a smaller region with fewer frames is
remapped for the same threshold. Unfortunately, both these approaches are problematic. Because the number of ran-
domizations have to be high enough to avoid birthday-paradox attacks [33], the threshold has to be several tens of
factors smaller than PCM’s endurance limit (e.g., 221 overwrites per randomization for a 108 endurance limit results
in about 50 randomizations before wear out). Therefore, the first approach is unacceptable. As a result, some previ-
ous schemes incur high write overhead to achieve reasonable worst-case lifetimes. For instance, Security Refresh’s
one-level wear leveling [24] and Start Gap [19] remap one block per write amounting to 100% write overhead.
Because of their worst-case assumption, the schemes incur this high write overhead for both normal applications
(i.e., common case) and malicious attacks (i.e., worst case).
The second approach randomizes a block in a smaller region resulting in overwrites being spread over fewer
frames. However, the approach can be strengthened by another level of randomization over a larger region so that
overwrites are spread over many frames. The second level of randomization can use a high threshold without
decreasing the number of randomizations as is the case with the first approach because there are sufficient first-level
randomizations. However, the second approach leads to significant hardware overhead. For instance, Security
Refresh’s two-level wear leveling [24] tracks every 2-MB region requiring 4192 sets of counters and secure keys for
a 8-GB memory.
While these counters are small (e.g., 12-15 bits), their total byte-count is misleading. There is significant logic
overhead in terms of incrementers for counters and pointers, comparators, XOR hash for secure keys, and tables to
identify a region’s counters within the larger memory bank (e.g., 512 MB). Because internal banks are accessed in
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parallel, the pointers and counters have to be incremented in parallel disallowing sharing of the logic across multiple
banks. To ensure wear leveling despite a compromised OS, Security Refresh proposes to place all this logic in the
PCM chips. While modern DRAMs provide just one counter per bank for refresh purposes,
Security Refresh adds per bank a pair of incrementers and XOR hashes, a comparator, and a table of 256 sets of
counters, pointers, and keys. This substantial hardware overhead will impose significant loss of density. Further, in
the likely scenario of PCM density improving faster than PCM endurance, this solution does not scale well as it
would require tracking 2-MB regions in ever-growing memories, incurring exponentially larger hardware over tech-
nology generations. To sum up, because of their assumption that every write overwrites the same memory block, the
previous schemes incur either high write overhead in the common case, or permanent, high hardware overhead (i.e.,
in all cases) to achieve reasonable worst-case lifetimes.
To address these overheads, we make our first key observation that the previous schemes assume that every write
is a worst-case overwrite, and count every write against the threshold for the number of writes per randomization.
Due to good on-chip caches, however, the average memory overwrite rates in the common case, and even highly-
memory-intensive applications, are orders of magnitude lower (e.g., average overwrite rate is less than 1 per 10,000).
For the same threshold, and hence the same number of randomizations, a lower overwrite rate would imply (1) a
lower write overhead in the first approach above, or (2) a larger region with lower hardware overhead in the second
approach.
To determine the overwrite rate, we make our second key observation that overwrite rates below a low cut-off rate,
1/cutOff, can be approximated conservatively to be equal to1/cutOffwith the guarantee that the actual wear does not
exceed the approximate wear (e.g., overwrite rates below 1 in 4000 can be approximated to be 1/4000). While this
approximation increases the write overhead only slightly (at most 1/4000 = 0.025%), measuring the actual overwrite
rate poses a challenge. A brute-force approach of observing overwrites in a window ofcutOf writes would deter-
mine the actual overwrite rate above1/cutOff. However, this approach would require a hardware buffer to hold the
last window of writes so that every write searches through the buffer (e.g., a 4000-entry buffer forcutOff= 4000). A
lower1/cutOff implies less write overhead, but also a larger buffer which increases complexity and power.
Instead, we explore an elegant alternative where we apply basic statistical sampling so that a much smaller buffer
can accurately estimate the overwrite rate (e.g., a 13-entry buffer per 2 GB suffices). We proposestatistical wear lev-
eling (SWL)which randomizes address-to-frame mapping on the basis of the estimated overwrite rates instead of
write rates. In general, sampling can provide estimates within a desired error at a desired level of confidence for a
given standard deviation of the population. However, worst-case guarantees would be hard if we make assumptions
about the standard deviation of overwrites. We avoid such assumptions based on our third key observation that
because we care only about overwrite rates above1/cutOff, we can bound the standard deviation to achieve high-con-
fidence estimates while requiring a small buffer. Bounding the deviation using1/cutOff is fundamental to making
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sampling work for our worst-case problem. Further, in general sampling, the larger the standard deviation, the
smaller the error, or both, the more the samples and hence the larger our hardware buffer. By choosing1/cutOffto be
low enough to reduce the write overhead and at the same time high enough to ensure a tight bound on the standard
deviation, we can afford low error while requiring a small buffer. To provide worst-case guarantees, we conserva-
tively account for the error in our estimates.
The net effect is the following. Security Refresh incurs either high write overhead of 50% or more in the common
case (single level), or high hardware overhead of a set of logic for every 2 MB (two level) while achieving about 25
months of worst-case lifetime. In contrast, SWL achieves low write overhead of less than 0.15%, and similar, high
lifetime of thousands of years in the common case; SWL trades off higher write overhead of 400% and lower yet rea-
sonable lifetime of more than 6 months in the worst case to achieve low hardware overhead of a set of logic and a 13-
entry sampling buffer for every 2 GB. This trade-off is reasonable because (1) write overhead is unimportant in the
uncommon worst case, (2) a worst-case lifetime of about 6 months under malicious attack is acceptable assuming the
attack would be detected in that time (in fact, SWL can be used to detect the attacks), and (3) hardware overhead is
permanent (i.e., in all cases, even when there is no attack). Because of low overwrite rates of normal applications, all
the schemes achieve high common-case lifetimes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide background on PCM wear leveling and discuss related
work in Section 2. We describe SWL in Section 3. We explain our methodology in Section 4. We show our results in
Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
2  Phase Change Memory (PCM): Background and Related Work
While DRAM is a charge-based storage technology, PCM
uses phase — crystalline or amorphous — to store state.
The two phases exhibit different resistivities that can be
detected to determine the phase. PCM retains its phase
even in the absence of electric power, making PCM a non-
volatile technology. In a typical transistor-based imple-
mentation, each PCM cell is made of a BJT transistor and
a storage element (conceptually, a resistor) which is connected to the BJT’s emitter at one end and a bitline at the
other [7] (see Figure 1). The BJT’s base is connected to the wordline and the collector is connected to ground. Reads
occur by asserting the wordline which turns on the BJT, causing current flow through the storage element due to the
voltage applied at the bitline. This current, which varies depending on the storage element’s state, is sensed at the end
of the bitline to determine the state stored in the cell. For writes, instead of sensing the current flow through the stor-
age element, a current is sent through the bitline to heat the storage element, causing the element to change its phase.









The magnitude and duration of the current flow determines the element’s resultant phase.
2.1 Performance, energy, and wear
We briefly discuss PCM’s performance and energy before wear which is our main focus. PCM’s total read and
write latencies are longer than those of DRAM; write latencies are much longer (e.g., 10x-20x). Many architecture
papers have proposed techniques such as caching [20] and optimized row buffers [13] to address this latency issue.
Because wear leveling incurs write overhead, the longer write latency is a significant concern. The longer latency
fundamentally implies longer occupancy which reduces bandwidth even in heavily-banked PCM memories where
bank conflicts are inevitable. While PCM’s longer latencies can be hidden by multi-threading, such hiding exacer-
bates bandwidth pressure. PCM’s total read and write energies are more than those of DRAM; write energies are
much higher (e.g., 20x-30x). To address the high write energy, many architecture papers have proposed bit-level
compare-and-write schemes [30] (caching and row buffers also reduce write energy).
Because writes involve heating the storage element to change its phase, writes cause PCM cells to wear out. In
general, PCM cells can endure about 108 writes whereas DRAM cells wear out after about 1016 writes [23]. If left
unaddressed, PCM-based memory could wear out in a few days even with normal applications; a malicious attack
can wear out a memory frame in a few hundred seconds [19].
2.2 Related work
There has been significant recent work on technology, devices, and materials for PCM [6][7][8][11][21][26].
Some recent architecture papers propose hardware techniques to alleviate PCM’s reliability problem. Many papers
target average-case wear without any worst case guarantees which are important because of the speed at which the
damage can occur and the permanence of the damage. Some papers propose rotation within a row ([30]) or a page
[20] to level wear within a row or a page. Other papers propose bit-level compare and write so that only the differ-
ence is written [30][34]. To hold the rotation amounts (e.g., one per 4-KB row or 8-KB page), these schemes employ
hardware tables which are as large as virtual memory and add overhead. Another work [9] proposes to spread the
contents of a physical page into two pages that have complementary wear which incurs the overhead of tracking
wear at cache-block granularity. In contrast, SWL provides worst-case guarantees while incurring significantly less
overhead (e.g., 13-entry buffer per 2 GB). An orthogonal work proposes to tackle wear out via error correction dif-
ferent from traditional ECC which primarily target soft errors [22].
2.2.1 Wear leveling via randomization
Start Gap [19] performs wear leveling by statically randomizing the physical memory layout and by periodically
changing the address-to-frame mapping to the next frame. Security Refresh [24] strengthens Start Gap’s approach to
provide worst-case lifetime guarantee by periodically randomizing the address-to-frame mapping of amemory
region(e.g., 512 MB). To bound the worst-case wear incurred by any memory frame between two randomizations of
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a region, Security Refresh forces a randomization afternumWriteswrites to the region assuming that every write
overwrites the same location. Remapping an entire region in one go would be bursty. Instead, the scheme spreads out
the remapping in time by swapping one memory block at a time with a randomly-chosen block. Accordingly, if there
arenumFramesframes in the region then the next block is swapped afterswapThreshold writes where
swapThreshold= numWrites/numFrames (EQ 1)
For example, for a 512-MB region and 512-byte blocks, and assumingnumWrites= 221, numFrames= 220 and
swapThreshold= 1/2. We call one set ofnumWriteswrites as ageneration.
A key issue with the choice ofnumWritesis that assuming PCM can endure 108 overwrites, the number of gener-
ations is given by
numGenerations = 108/numWrites (EQ 2)
numGenerationsmust be large enough to ensure that each block gets randomized after the frame loses only a
small amount of its life in the worst case (in our above example, the number of generations is 108/221 or about 50).
To see why, assume that the number of generations is just two so that a frame may lose half its lifetime in just one
generation. Then, a malicious attack that repeatedly overwrites a block 108/2 times before picking a random block to
overwrite can find the frame with half remaining lifetime in about(2*numFrames)1/2 attempts [33]. This assertion
follows from the birthday paradox which states that givend days in the year, there is a high probability that a set of
(2*d)1/2 people will include at least two people with the same birthday [31]. A sufficiently large number of genera-
tions (e.g., 50) makes such attacks ineffective as it would take an astronomically many attempts to find randomly the
same frame that number of times. Start Gap’s approach of statically randomizing achieves insufficient number of
generations and is vulnerable to birthday-paradox attacks whereas Security Refresh’s sufficient randomization
avoids this pitfall.
Each randomization involves remapping the region’s memory blocks which incurs significant write overhead and
consumes the already-scarce PCM write bandwidth and energy; remapping incurs extra reads too but writes are
much slower than reads and hence write overhead is more important. Returning to the above example, we see that
swapThreshold= 1/2 implies 50% write overhead as every other write turns into a swap (2 reads and 2 writes). That
is,
Single-level Security Refresh’s writeOverhead= 1/swapThreshold (EQ 3)
With good randomization, each block has the potential to be mapped to all thenumFramesframes over time.
Assuming the worst-case of overwriting the same block, all the frames have one generation of theirworst-case life-
time left after about
number of worst-case writes= (numGenerations - 1) * numWrites * numFrames / (1+ writeOverhead) (EQ 4)
In the above equation, we conservatively exclude the last generation of lifetime (i.e., the “- 1” t rm) because in the
last generation some frames would fail before the others. Also, swaps per frame, being as many as generations are
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not counted because such swaps are much fewer than the above expression (e.g., 50 generations means 50 swaps
which is much less than the above expression). We include the effect of the write overhead of the swaps which
degrade lifetime. While the swap overhead would extend lifetime by delaying application writes, we do not consider
this effect in the above expression because such extensions are not useful lifetimes available to the application. While
worst-case lifetime is in the context of an attack or a bug and not normal application, we still do not include such
extension to keep our lifetime calculations uniform between common-case and worst-case contexts. (Because Secu-
rity Refresh includes this extension in its lifetime calculations, our results are somewhat different from that paper’s.).
If each write takes 1µs then the worst-case lifetime for our example is more than 2 years. Recall from Section 1 that
without any wear leveling, repeated overwrites take mere 100 s to wear out a frame. Note that (1) throughout the
paper we repeat similar calculations and therefore it is important to understand the above terms and calculations; (2)
because all schemes achieve good common-case lifetime due to low common-case overwrite rate, we discuss that
metric only in Section 5 and not throughout the paper.
Security Refresh uses a running pointer per region to identify the next block to be swapped, and two secure keys
per region — an old and a new — for the random swaps. The blocks above the pointer have already been swapped
and hence use the new key to locate the new frame, whereas the blocks below the pointer have not been swapped and
use the old key. In addition, every region has a counter that counts the writes to the region and triggers the next swap
whenever the counter exceedsswapThreshold. When the running pointer wrap around (i.e., all the frames have been
swapped in one round), the next new key is generated. Security Refresh places all of these circuits on-chip so that the
swaps are done securely in hardware even if that the OS is compromised.
The key reason for the high write overhead is thatswapThresholdis small becausenumFramesis large andnum-
Writescannot be increased. One option to decreasenumFramesis larger memory blocks but if the granularity of
writes reaching memory — L2 or L3 cache block — is smaller than the memory block then the swaps incur higher
write overhead (e.g., write backs of 128-byte cache blocks would trigger swaps of 2-K memory blocks). Another
option is to decrease the memory region but doing so would reduce the overall lifetime because overwrites would get
spread out over a smaller region.
To overcome this dilemma, Security Refresh employs a two-level wear leveling where the first level uses a smaller
region for a largerswapThresholdwhereas the second level uses a larger region over which overwrites get spread
out. For example, the first level uses 2-MB regions and 512-byte blocks so thatnumWrites1 = 2
19, numFrames1 = 2
12
andswapThreshold1 = 64. The second level uses 512-MB regions and 512-byte blocks so thatnumFrames2 = 2
20,
and setsswapThreshold2 = 128. While thisswapThreshold2 value increasesnumWrites2 (for the second level) to be
227 which in turn decreases the second level’s number of generations to less than 1, the first level’s number of gener-
ations is high enough (about 400) to thwart any birthday-paradox attacks. The write overhead is1/swapThreshold1 +
1/swapThreshold2 = numFrames1/numWrites1 + numFrames2/numWrites2. BecausenumWrites1 must be small to
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resist attacks andnumFrames2 must be large for high lifetime, the two-level scheme achieve low write overhead by
making numFrames1 small andnumWrites2 large. While the single-level scheme incurs 50% write overhead to
achieve more than 2 years of worst-case lifetime, the two-level scheme incurs 1/64 + 1/128 = 2.3% write overhead to
achieve more than 3 years of worst-case lifetime.
Unfortunately, a smallnumFrames1 incurs high hardware overhead. For a 8-GB memory using 2-MB first-level
regions, there are 4196 sets of secure keys, counters, and pointers. As mentioned in Section 1, though the counters
are only 12-15 bits in size, there is significant logic overhead in terms of incrementers for the counter and pointer,
comparators, XOR hashes for the secure keys, and tables for the regions within an internal memory bank which is
typically much bigger (e.g., 512 Mb or 64 MB). Because of internal-bank parallelism in memory.chips, the pointers
and counters cannot share the logic among multiple banks. Adding this amount of logic on-chip is a substantial over-
head which will cause loss of density given that modern DRAMs place just one counter per bank to support
refreshes. The overhead is problematic especially considering that PCM density is likely to improve faster than PCM
endurance requiring the same 2-MB regions in larger and larger memories. Thus, because of their worst-case
assumption, the single-level scheme incurs high write overhead in the common case, and two-level scheme incurs
permanent, high hardware overhead (i.e., in all cases) to achieve reasonable worst-case lifetimes.
3  Statistical Wear Leveling
Recall from Section 1 that we wish to reduce the above overheads based on our first observation that the previous
schemes count every write againstswapThresholdunder the worst-case assumption that every write is an overwrite
of the same location. However, typical average overwrite rates of normal applications, including highly-memory
intensive ones, are orders of magnitude lower than the write rate due to good caching (e.g., one in 4000 writes is an
overwrite). With lower overwrite rates, we can achieve either lower write overhead in Security Refresh’s single-level
scheme or lower hardware overhead in Security Refresh’s two-level scheme while maintaining the samenumWrites,
and hence the same number of generations. Nevertheless, we must guarantee reasonable lifetimes for the worst-case
overwrite rates and not just the average-case rates. To this end, we proposestatistical wear leveling (SWL)which
randomizes on the basis of overwrite rates instead of write rates.
We determine the overwrite rate based on our second observation that overwrite rates lower than1/cutOffcan be
approximated conservatively to be equal to1/cutOff(e.g., overwrite rates below 1 in 4000 can be approximated to be
1/4000). While this approximation guarantees that the actual wear does not exceed the approximate wear and only
slightly increases the write overhead (at most 1/4000 = 0.025%), measuring the actual overwrite rate poses a chal-
lenge. Observing overwrites in a window ofcutOffwrites would determine the actual overwrite rate above1/cutOff.
However, this brute-force approach would require a hardware buffer to hold the last window of writes for every later
write to search through the buffer (e.g., a 4000-entry buffer forcutOff= 4000). This buffer would increase hardware
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complexity and power.
Instead, we employ a much smaller buffer by applying basic statistical sampling to estimate the overwrite rate.
While sampling can provide estimates within a desired error at a desired level of confidence for a given standard
deviation of the population, making assumptions about the standard deviation of the overwrite rate would make
worst-case guarantees hard. We avoid this problem via our third observation that because we wish to estimate over-
write rates only above1/cutOff, we can bound the standard deviation to achieve high-confidence estimates. This
bounding is fundamental to making sampling work for our worst-case problem. Further, while larger standard devia-
tion and/or smaller error require more samples and hence a larger buffer, we choose1/cutOff to be low enough to
reduce the write overhead and high enough to bound tightly the standard deviation. Therefore, we can achieve a low
error with a small buffer. To ensure worst-case guarantees, we conservatively account for the error in our estimates.
3.1 Sampling
We estimate the overwrite rate by observing the number of writes between consecutive overwrites to a memory
location. This number and the overwrite rate are inverses of each other. We call this intervening number of writes as
the overwrite distance, or simply thedistance. To estimate the distance, we samplenumSampleswrites from a popu-
lation ofnumPopulationwrites and record the distance to the next overwrite for each of the samples. The population
is the set of writes after which some action is taken — i.e., triggering a randomization — based on the estimates
obtained. For a large enough number of samples selected uniformly at random, sampling theory states that the mini-
mum required number of samples is given by:
wherez is the normal distribution value dependent on the desired confidence level,s is the standard deviation in
the population, andε is the allowed error in the estimated variable [32].
We are interested in estimating the overwrite rate only above1/cutOff, or equivalently, the overwrite distance
belowcutOff. That is, we conservatively set any of our samples’ distance abovecutOff to be equal tocutOff. Thus,
our samples’ distance can be only between 0 andcutOff. Now,
where eachx is an instance in the population, is the average, andn is the number of instances. Because eachx
for us is between 0 andcutOff, s is largest when half the instances are 0 and the other half arecutOff. In that

































Further, settingz = 3 gives us 99.99% confidence. Thus,
BecausenumSamplesdirectly affects the size of our hardware buffer (as we show later in Section 3.3), we wish to
reducenumSamples. Though reducingcutOff2 would reducenumSamples, doing so would increase our cut-off rate
which in turn would loosen our approximation and increase our write overhead. Therefore, we wish to keepcutOffas
large as possible. In contrast,numSamplesis inversely proportional toε2 whereasε affects the sampled distance only
additively (i.e., real distance is sampled distance± ε). By subtractingε from the sampled distance with a lower bound
of 1, our estimate can be conservative (i.e., the estimated overwrite rate is higher than the actual overwrite rate). Of
course, drastically increasingε would lead to highly conservative estimates. Therefore, we increaseε to a small frac-
tion of cutOffto reducenumSamplesby a large amount.
Because normal yet even highly-memory-intensive applications’ typical average case overwrite rate is less than 1/
4000, we setcutOff= 4000 andε = 200 and obtain
 and (EQ 5)
samplingRate = numSamples/numPopulation (EQ 6)
AssumingnumPopulation= 220, our sampling rate is 900/220 = 0.000858. In other words, each write has a
0.086% chance of being sampled. Note that because we take samples fromnumPopulationwrites and then decide to
trigger a randomization during the nextnumPopulationwrites, at most2 * numPopulationwrites may occur between
our randomizations. This observation implies that
numWrites = 2 * numPopulation (EQ 7)
By settingnumPopulationto be 220, we achievenumWrites= 221or about 50 generations for an endurance of 108
overwrites.
3.2 Sample buffer operation
Using the above sampling rate, SWL samples the writes arriving at a memory region. The sampling uses hardware
random number generation typically implemented using a linear shift register. SWL places the samples in a FIFO
buffer, called thesample buffer, and compares every write to the region against all the samples. If an incoming write
address matches a sample address (i.e., an overwrite has occurred) then the sample is complete, else the sample’s dis-
tance is incremented signifying that another write has occurred without an overwrite. If the incremented distance hits
cutOff then also the sample is complete signifying that the sample has fallen below the cut-off. Upon a sample com-
pletion, the sample’s distance minusε (lower-bounded by 1) is added into the per regiont tal distanceand the pe












At the end ofnumPopulationwrites,sample count/total distancegives thesampleOverwriteRate, andnumPopula-
tion * sampleOverwriteRategives the estimated number of overwrites in the lastnumPopulationwrites. Though the
overwrites could have gone to different memory locations, we conservatively assume the worst case that the over-
write count corresponds to a single memory location within thebank? region. Consequently, when the estimated
overwrites exceednumPopulationthen SWL should trigger a randomization of thebank? region. To avoid randomiz-
ing an entire region in one go, the previous schemes spread out the region’s swaps over the entire generation ofnum-
Writes writes. That is, the schemes trigger a swap after everyswapThresholdwrites (from Equation 1). Because
SWL estimates overwrites and does not count writes, SWL should spread out the swaps overnumPopulationesti-
mated overwrites.
Accordingly, SWL should trigger a swap after everynumPopulation/numFramesestimated overwrites which cor-
responds tonumPopulation/numFrames * 1/sampleOverwriteRatewrites. Here,sampleOverwriteRateis the over-
write rate obtained by the samples (as explained above). Because SWL observes only the sampled writes and not all
writes, we adjust this value by the sampling rate to trigger a swap after everynumPopulation/numFrames * numSam-
ples/numPopulation * 1/sampleOverwriteRate= numSamples/numFrames * 1/sampleOverwriteRatecompleted sam-
ples. A separate counter called theswap countracks the number completed samples since the last swap and triggers
a swap aftersampleSwapThreshold completed samples where
SWL’s sampleSwapThreshold = numSamples/numFrames * 1/sampleOverwriteRate (EQ 8)
sampleSwapThresholdcompleted samples in SWL plays the role ofswapThresholdwrites in Security Refresh.
For example, assumingnumSamples= 900,numFrames= 220, and a common-casesampleOverwriteRateof 1/4000,
sampleSwapThreshold= 3.43. Because SWL has to count this number of completed samples before triggering a
swap, real designs can simplify the abovesampleSwapThresholdcalculation by approximating the relevant quanti-
ties to powers of two. Nevertheless, it would be problematic if this number were a fraction. We address this issue
later in Section 3.4.2.
Recall from Section 2.2.1 that single-level Security Refresh incurs high write overhead and two-level Security
Refresh incurs high hardware overhead. While the previous single-level schemes (single-level Security Refresh or
Start Gap) trigger a swap afterswapThresholdwrites, SWL triggers a swap aftersampleSwapThresholdcompleted
samples. Because each completed sample corresponds to1/samplingRate writes in the application,
SWL’s writeOverhead= samplingRate/sampleSwapThreshold (EQ 9)
= numFrames * sampleOverwriteRate/numPopulation (from Equation 6 and Equation 8)
= Single-level Security Refresh’s writeOverhead * sampleOverwriteRate * 2 (from Equation 3 and Equation 7)
The expression for SWL’s worst-case lifetime in terms of number of writes is same as that of Security Refresh
(Equation 4). Because the overwrite rate is typically orders-of-magnitude smaller than the write rate for normal
applications (i.e., the common case),sampleOverwriteRateis a small quantity (e.g., 1/4000). Consequently, SWL
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achieves orders-of-magnitude lower common-case write overhead than the previous schemes while maintaining the
same number of generations (i.e., samenumWritesimplying samenumGenerations, from Equation 2).
For the one-level Security Refresh example in Section 2.2.1 wherenumWrites= 221, numFrames= 220, and
swapThreshold= 1/2 or 50% write overhead, SWL’s common-case write overhead is less than 0.03% assuminga -
pleOverwriteRate <1/4000. Recall from Section 2.2.1 that two-level Security Refresh’s smallnumFrames1 results in
low write overhead (about 2.3%) but high hardware overhead of tracking 2-MB first-level regions. For the example,
this tracking requires 4192 sets of two keys, one counter, and one pointer. In contrast, SWL tracks 512-MB regions
(220 x 512-byte blocks = 512 MB) requiring just 16 sets of two keys, one counter, one pointer, and one 13-entry sam-
ple buffer for the entire 8-GB memory (we reduce this overhead further in Section 3.4.2). Thus, by leveraging the
fact that common-case overwrites are orders-of-magnitude fewer than writes, SWL can achieve similar. low write
overhead as two-level Security Refresh while tracking orders-of-magnitude larger regions and hence cutting hard-
ware overhead by that much.
In the worst case, wheresampleOverwriteRateis 1, SWL’s write overhead is 100% (Equation 9) and worst-case
lifetime is more than 1.5 years (Equation 4), as compared to two-level Security Refresh’s write overhead of 2.3% and
worst-case lifetime of more than 3 years. As discussed in Section 1, (1) write overhead is unimportant in the uncom-
mon worst case, (2) a worst-case lifetime of 1.5 years under malicious attack is acceptable assuming the attack would
be detected in that time (SWL can be used for such detection), and (3) hardware overhead is permanent (i.e., in all
cases, even when there is no attack).
3.3 Sample buffer size
The remaining issue is the size of the sample buffer needed for our samples. Samples are inserted into the buffer
using a memoryless process. Our cut-off implies that any sampled write stays in the buffer for at mostcutOffwrites.
Therefore, the number of entries in the buffer is at most the number of samples chosen in the lastcutOff writes,
which follows the Poisson distribution. The samples are chosen independently of each other and the average number
of buffer entriesλ is bounded by Little’s law as (maximum buffer residency * sampling rate) so that
λ = cutOff * samplingRate (EQ 10)
Consequently, the number of buffer entries follows the Poisson distribution and the probability of exceedingk
entries is given by
SettingcutOff= 4000,samplingRate= 0.000858, yieldsλ to be less than 4 and the probability of exceeding a 13-
entry sample buffer to be less than 0.01%. Thus, a small sample buffer suffices.
We note that upon exceeding the buffer capacity we simply remove the oldest sample (FIFO order) and add the








sample’s current distance to the total distance. Because the sample’s distance is recorded before completion, the
recorded distance is shorter than the real distance if the sample had completed, and hence, is conservative. Because
the overflow probability is small, this conservative distance would only slightly increase the write overhead.
3.4 Implementation
To ensure wear leveling even in the presence of a compromised OS, Security Refresh places all the wear leveling
logic in the PCM chip and employs on-chip hardware to swap the memory blocks, obfuscating the address-to-frame
mapping from the OS. One may think that the logic could be placed in the memory controller and not in the PCM
chip. However, doing so poses correctness difficulties for modern I/O devices which access memory through DMA
independently of the memory controller (viabus-masteringand first-party DMA). The memory controller would
have to propagate the secure keys and region pointers to the I/O devices to ensure that the DMAs use the correct
address-to-frame mapping. Given that the mappings would change at arbitrary times with respect to the DMA occur-
rences, it would be hard to keep the mappings up-to-date. Further, the independent DMA accesses would be missed
in the memory controller’s count of writes inswapThreshold, so that DMA writes would not undergo wear leveling.
Indeed, this problem could give rise to DMA-based attacks. If the wear-leveling logic is in the PCM chip, then the
DMA accesses can both be mapped and be counted correctly. SWL helps the on-chip option by greatly reducing the
amount of the on-chip hardware,
Apart from being resilient to a compromised OS, there is another advantage of wear leveling in hardware (on-chip
or memory controller). Modern OSs often rely on physical addresses that do not change due to various reasons such
as legacy I/O devices that cannot handle larger physical addresses, and I/O buffers and kernel pages whose addresses
do not change after boot-up, While these physical addresses do not change, the wear leveling hardware can change
the address-to-frame mapping underneath the OS to achieve wear leveling for the corresponding frames.
3.4.1 Memory controller scheduling issues
Performing wear leveling without the knowledge of the memory controller raises two issues. First, if the wear lev-
eling region is larger than an internal PCM bank, then the random block swaps would cause memory blocks to cross
internal banks. Such swaps would imply that the memory controller cannot determine the bank to which a specific
access occurs, preventing bank scheduling optimizations done by modern memory controllers. To avoid this prob-
lem, we ensure that our regions do not exceed a bank, like Security Refresh. Because PCM banks would be large like
DRAM banks, our regions are large enough to achieve sufficient wear leveling. For instance, 512-byte blocks and
512-MB banks in a 8-GB memory with 16 banks givesnumFrames= 220. Thus, each block has a choice of 220
frames for random mapping, and withnumWrites= 221, SWL’s worst-case write overhead is 100% (Equation 9) and
more than 1.5 years of worst-case lifetime (Equation 4). AssumingsampleOverwriteRate <1/4000, SWL’s com-
mon-case write overhead is less than 0.03% (Equation 9). This bank constraint is fundamental to all the schemes that
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perform on-chip wear leveling and limitsnumFrameswhich in turn limits the worst-case lifetime (wear leveling
using the memory controller has some difficulties, as discussed above in Section 3.4).
We note that banks become larger as memory chip capacity grows to avoid an explosion of the bank count. Conse-
quently, our write overhead would either hold steady if the cache block size also grows with memory size (i.e.,num-
Framesstays the same), or decrease if the cache block size remains the same (i.e.,numFramesincreases). We caution
the reader that one could arrive at the same result by recomputing the above numbers by considering each chip. For
example, assuming 8 1-GB chips to make up the above 8-GB memory and 16 512-Mb internal banks within each
chip, each 512-byte block contributes 512 bits per chip givingnumFrames= 220.
Second, the memory controller should not schedule an access while the PCM module performs a random block
swap. This constraint is unique in that though the DRAM refresh counter is on-chip in a modern DRAM which inter-
nally performs refreshes, the refresh trigger comes from the memory controller which avoids scheduling accesses till
the refresh is complete (in current systems, independent DMA controllers and the memory controller go through
arbitration to avoid scheduling conflicts). However, adding a handshake between the memory controller and the
PCM module for every access would impose significant latency. Instead, we propose that the memory controller
speculatively send requests to the PCM module which would nack the request if a block swap is in progress. Given
that SWL’s swaps are infrequent (i.e., the common-case write overhead is less than 1%), the requests would not be
nacked in the common case. In addition to being infrequent, the swaps are fast as they move only a few blocks (we
batch a few swaps together, as discussed in Section 3.4.2). Therefore, the nacked requests are not delayed signifi-
cantly.
3.4.2 Reducing our hardware overhead
While the above issues are due to bypassing the memory controller, placing the wear leveling logic on-chip raises
the issue that using memory regions as large as banks would imply one sample buffer per bank. As mentioned in
Section 3.2, each sample buffer is a fully-associative FIFO accompanied by a few counters and a linear shift register
to generate random numbers. Though SWL’s overhead is per 512-MB region whereas Security Refresh’s overhead is
per 2-MB region, we further reduce SWL’s overhead by observing that the sample buffer and associated logic can be
shared among multiple banks. That is, one sample buffer and associated logic is shared among multiple banks even
though each block is swapped only within its own bank to avoid the bank scheduling problem discussed above.
For example, one sample buffer for 4 banks or 2 GB of memory (2 Gb per chip) results in 4 sample buffers per
chip. Using 512-byte blocks,numFrames= 2 GB/512 = 222, and withnumWrites= 221, we get single-level Security
Refresh’sswapThreshold= numWrites/numFrames= 1/2 (Equation 1) and write overhead is 200% (Equation 3).
Assuming sampleOverwriteRate< 1/4000 gives SWL’s common-case write overhead to be less than 0.1%
(Equation 9). Thus, we can trade off the common-case write overhead and the hardware overhead due to the region
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size. Though reducing the number of sample buffers by a factor ofn increases the common-case write overhead by
the same factor, SWL’s low common-case write overhead makes this trade-off practical.
In addition, the worst case behavior is also affected by the trade-off. SWL’s worst-case write overhead goes to
400% (Equation 9). Further, because 512-byte blocks are swapped within 512-MB regions and not within 2-GB
regions,numFramesrelevant for worst-case lifetime in Equation 4 remains 220 (i.e., overwrites are spread over 1-GB
regions and not 4-GB regions). Thus, SWL’s worst-case lifetime is more than 7 months (Equation 4), Recall from
Section 3.2 that trading off some worst-case performance to lower the permanent hardware overhead is acceptable.
Moreover, because the buffer size depends only oncutOffandsamplingRate(Equation 10) which do not change due
to the sharing, the shared sample buffer remains as small as before.
We note that the shared buffer samples for the 2-GB region and uses all the samples to obtain a singles mple-
OverwriteRatefor the region. One may think that the worst-case overwrite overhead can be reduced by tracking
banks which are smaller than 2 GB (i.e., smallernumFrames), and at the same time reduce the hardware overhead by
using a shared buffer for 2 GB. However, doing so would imply that the number of samples per bank may not satisfy
Equation 5.
The remaining issue is that sharing the sample buffer among multiple banks increasesnumFrames(e.g., from 220
to 222) and thereby reducessampleSwapThreshold(Equation 8). For example, our previoussampleSwapThresholdof
3.43 reduces to 0.86. Recall from Section 3.2 thatsampleSwapThresholdbecoming a fraction is problematic because
SWL has to count this number of completed samples before triggering a swap. To address this problem, we trigger a
batch of swaps whensampleSwapThresholdbecomes integral (e.g., for a batch size of 7 corresponding tosam-
pleSwapThresholdof 6). Note that batching changes only the schedule of the swaps and notumWritesor numGen-
erations. Therefore, batching does not affect lifetime in any way. Long batches, however, would make the swaps
bursty and thereby may make the memory module unresponsive for the long duration of the batch. Because our
swaps are infrequent and batches are small, this concern is not serious. As a comparison point, we note that modern
DRAMs refresh an entire bank in one go to reduce the number of the refresh triggers on the command channel (e.g.,
a 1-Gb bank may have 32K, 32-Kb rows).
Each chip in the memory module has its own sample buffer(s) which can operate independently of the other chips’
buffer(s). That is, there is no need for the different chips to pick the same writes to sample or to perform swaps in
lock step. In fact, each chip’s random number generator state and secure keys could be different from those of the
other chips so that a given block could be stored in different frames across the chips. Because the swaps occur within
an internal bank, the block is stored in the same bank across the chips. Upon an access, each chip retrieves its part of
the block using its key. The only requirement is that the actions of a swap — updating of the pointers within the
banks and the swaps themselves — be atomic. This requirement is satisfied by the PCM module nacking any request
during a swap, as explained above.
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We note that while modern DRAMs employ one refresh counter per internal bank to sweep through the bank
whereas PCM being non-volatile does not need to be refreshed. One could think of the two sample buffers and asso-
ciated counters to be in place of the refresh support.
3.4.3 Preserving row locality
Apart from the sample buffer hardware overhead issue, randomizing memory blocks that are smaller than a row
destroys row locality (e.g., in each chip, 512-bit blocks versus 32-Kb row or for the whole module 512-byte block
versus 32-KB row). That is, consecutive blocks when randomized may be fall into different rows. Making the blocks
as large as a row for the same region would reducenumFrameswhich in turn reduces lifetime because blocks are
randomized over fewer frames (Equation 4). Instead, we propose to preserve row locality by randomizing the rows
and then randomizing the blocks within a row (Security Refresh briefly alludes to this approach). That is, we keep
the rows intact by swapping a row with a random row and then swap the row’s blocks with each other. This approach
does not need any extra keys as the higher-order bits of a key can be applied to the row address to randomize the row
and the lower-order bits to the block addresses within each row to randomize the blocks. We emphasize that because
we randomize both the row and its blocks, each block has as many choices as frames in a region. Therefore we retain
the samenumFrames,and hence lifetime, as before. Though a row’s blocks stay together, the number of blocks per
row is large enough to prevent malicious or accidental overwriting of the same frame (e.g., there are 64 512-bit
blocks in a 32-Kb row).
4  Methodology
We simulate SWL using Wisconsin GEMS-2.1 [20] built on top of Simics, a full-system simulator. We simulate a
SPARC-based multicore running Solaris 10. For comparison, we also simulate both single-level and two-level Secu-
rity Refresh. The hardware parameters are given in Table 1. Because PCM is an emerging technology, there are some
differences in the latency numbers reported by various papers [21][6][11][7][26][8]. We choose a mid value as a
compromise. We also use CACTI’s DRAM models [25] for the array decode, row buffers, and wiring latencies (these
components are similar in PCM and DRAM). We account for latencies, bank and bus occupancies, and queuing at
the controllers in all the memory components.
We use commercial and scientific workloads briefly described in Table 2. The table also shows the memory foot-
prints, the L3 miss rates, and the L3 writebacks per 10K CPU cycles which we use in Section 5.2. To account for sta-
tistical variations, we use enough randomly-perturbed runs to achieve 95% confidence [2].
5  Experimental Results
We first present the common-case overwrite distance for our benchmarks. Then we present the common-case
results — write overhead, performance degradation, lifetime, and hardware overhead — for our benchmarks. Finally,
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we present the worst-case write overhead and lifetime.
5.1 Common-case overwrite distance
Because measuring the overwrite distance using a brute-force approach of search-
ing through a large window of past writes inordinately slows down the simulations,
we use SWL’s sampling approach to solve this simulation problem. However,
because the approach does not allow us to observe overwrite distances larger than the
cutOff, we use a largecutOff (20,000), a smallε (100), and an unrealistically large
sample buffer (3000-entry). Note that we use such a large sample buffer only to solve
the simulation problem in determining the real overwrite distances; we simulate a
much smaller, realistic hardware buffer in later experiments. In Table 3, we show the
average overwrite distances for our benchmarks. We see that the overwrite distances are well over 10,000 (or over-
write rate is lower than 1/10000), which is our main observation that the common-case overwrite rates are orders-of-
Table 1: Hardware parameters
Cores 8, in-order
L1 Caches Split I&D, Private, 32K 4-way set associative, write-back, 64B cache block, LRU replacement, 3 cycle hit
L2 Cache Unified, Shared, 8M 8-way set associative, write-back, 8 banks, LRU replacement, 37 cycle hit
L3 Cache Unified, Shared, 32M 16-way set associative, 512B block, write-back, 16 banks, LRU replacement, 77
cycle hit
Coherence MESI Directory, Full bit vector
PCM-based memory 8 GB (8 8-Gb chips), 55 memory cycles for reads and 132 memory cycles for writes, 16 banks (512Mb per
chip), 64-byte interleaving, 32-entry bank queues (1 memory cycle = 10 CPU cycles)
Bus 128 bits (total), 1 memory cycle
SWL 13-entry sampling buffer per 2 Gb per chip (0.01% probability of overflow), samplingRate = 0.09%,
99.99% confidence, cutOff = 4000,ε = 200.








Apache is a web server. We use Apache 2.2.11 and SURGE v1.3 [3] with http 1.1 capability to generate
web requests from a repository of 20,000 files (~500 MB). We simulate 3200 clients, each with 25ms think









Online Transaction Processing (OLTP) models a database for a supplier, with many users performing
concurrent transactions. We use PostgreSQL v8.3.7 database server and Open Source Development Labs
Test Suite DBT-2 v0.40 [1] for modeling users based on TPC-C specifications. We use a5 GB database with
25,000 warehouses. We simulate 128 users with 0 think time, and warm up the database for ~100K transac-
tions before taking measurements for 200 transactions.
25% 4.68
SPECjbb2005is a Java-based server workload for OLTP in middleware. We use Sun J2SE v1.5.0 JVM. We
simulate 1.5 warehouses/CPU (~300 MB total) with 0 think time, warm up for 350K transactions and mea-






c Radix performs radix sort of 16M integers (64 MB). 12% 0.16
FFT computes Fourier transforms. We run the transpose computation of 222 complex numbers (64 MB). 13% 5.74
FMM  implements a fast multi-pole method (FMM) for an N-body problem of 64K particles (~64 MB). 10% 0.36












magnitude lower than the worst-case rate of 1. FMM sees few overwrites so that its estimated distance iscutOff - ε.
5.2 SWL vs. Security Refresh: Common case
We compare single-level and two-level Security Refresh (SR) with SWL in the common case. We use
swapThresholdof 1 for single-level SR andswapThreshold1 of 32 andswapThreshold2 of 128 for two-level SR
which are Security Refresh’s best settings. For a realistic sample buffer size of 13 entries (Table 1), SWL uses acut-
Off of 4000 andε of 200. Though the real overwrite distances are much larger (Section 5.1), we use a smallercutOff
for a realistic sample buffer size (Equation 10). SWL’s other settings are shown in Table 1.
First, we compare the schemes’ write overhead in Table 4.
Because Security Refresh’s write overhead is independent of the
workload (Equation 3), the write overhead is constant — 100% for
one-level SR and 4% for two-level SR. In contrast, SWL’s common-
case write overhead reduces by a factor ofsampleOverwriteRate
(Equation 9). Because the real overwrite rates are much lower than
the cutOff used in this experiment,sampleOverwriteRatefor all the
benchmarks are close to1/(cutOff-ε) = 1/3800. Thus, SWL’s common-case write overhead is less than 0.15% for all
the benchmarks.
Second, to see how write overhead affects performance, we compare the schemes’ performance in Figure 2 which
shows performance of one-level SR, two-level SR, and SWL normalized to that of a system without any wear level-
ing. Due to its high write overhead, one-level SR incurs more than 30% degradation for the commercial workloads
which have high miss rates (Table 2) and hence high memory traffic. While two-level SR incurs less than 5% degra-
dation, SWL incurs less than 1% degradation. The scientific workloads behave similarly but incur less degradation
due to their lower miss rates. The performance trend across the schemes tracks that of the write overheads in Table 4.








apache 100% 4% 0.12%
OLTP 100% 4% 0.13%
specjbb 100% 4% 0.11%
radix 100% 4% 0.11%
FFT 100% 4% 0.11%
FMM 100% 4% 0.11%
FIGURE 2: Common-case Performance: (a) Commercial Workloads (b) Scientific Workloads
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Third, we compare the schemes’ lifetime in Table 5. Through-
out the paper, we show worst-case lifetimes based on Equation 4.
While the common-case lifetime depends on overwrites patterns of
applications, determining the common-case lifetime via simula-
tions is not feasible due to inordinate simulation time. Instead, we
extend Equation 4 so that all the frames have one generation of
their common-case lifetime l ft after about
number of common-case writes= (EQ 11)
There are two differences between this expression and the worst-case lifetime (Equation 4). First, thesample-
OverwriteRateterm accounts for the fact that the frames are overwritten at the rate ofsampleOverwriteRatein the
common case. This equation assumes that all the blocks see the same overwrite rate ofsampleOverwriteRate. Note
that though Security Refresh triggers swaps assuming the worst-case overwrites of the same block, the common-case
lifetime is affected by the actual overwrite rate and not the worst-case rate (i.e., lifetime is degraded only when over-
writes actually occur, and not when overwrites are assumed to occur). Second, while the worst-case lifetime is com-
puted assuming a workload that floods memory with back-to-back writes, real applications’ rates of writes to
memory vary from one application to another. This effect is accounted for by thewriteRateterm. Table 2 (L3 write-
backs per 10K CPU cycles) showsriteRatefor the various benchmarks in the baseline system with no wear level-
ing. We assume PCM write latency of 1320 CPU cycles (Table 1) which at 2-GHz clock is about 0.66µs. From
Table 5, we see that all the schemes achieve high common-case lifetimes due to both low absolute write rates and
low overwrite rates (allsampleOverwriteRateare close to 1/3800). For a given application, the writeback rates under
the various schemes differ due to the variation in the write overheads (Table 4) and both these variations cause the
schemes’ common-case lifetimes to vary.SPECjbb’s lifetime for one-level SR is better than that for two-level SR
because one-level SR’s high performance degradation (Figure 2) ends up throttling the L3 writeback rate.
Finally, we compare the schemes’ hardware overhead in Table 6. The 20-bit incrementer is for the 20-bit pointer
which sweeps through the bank’s 220 frames for swapping (the 12-bit incremeter is for the 12-bit pointer used in each
first-level 2-MB region in two-level SR). The rest of the incrementers are for theswapThreshold1 and
swapThreshold2 (32 and 128) in two-level SR andsampleSwapThreshold(6) in SWL. The two 20-bit keys corre-
spond to the old and new keys for each region (Section 2.2.1). The two-level SR achieves low write overhead
(Table 4) at the cost of high hardware overhead whereas SWL achieves both low write overhead and low hardware
overhead. The key source of two-level SR’s overhead is the hardware for every first-level, 2-MB region which results
in 4192 sets of first-level keys, pointers, and counters for 8-GB memory. To keep the first-level write overhead low,
the first-level regions must remain fixed at 2 MB even as memory grows (Equation 3). This constraint implies that








apache 182 353 367
OLTP 159 197 214
specjbb 133 119 123
radix 3,142 4,902 6,208
FFT 186 193 174
FMM 1,451 2,656 2,781
numGenerations 1–( ) numWrites numFrames××
1 writeOverhead+( ) sampleOverwriteRate×
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- writeRate×
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two-level SR’s extra hardware grows rapidly as memory scales. In contrast, because SWL’s regions are the same as
the memory banks, which grow as memory grows, SWL’s extra hardware grows much more slowly (8-GB vs. 64-GB
memory in Table 6).
5.3 SWL vs. Security Refresh: Worst case
We show the worst-case write overhead (Equation 3 and
Equation 9) in Table 7 and the worst-case lifetime (Equation 4) in
Table 8. (We omit worst-case performance degradation which is not
meaningful.) We assume PCM write latency of 1320 CPU cycles (Table 1) which at 2-GHz clock is about 0.66µs.
As discussed in Section 3.4.2, SWL’s worst-case write overhead is higher due to the sharing of the sample buffer and
associated logic among 4 banks, which helps reduce the hardware overhead. Higher write overhead in the uncom-
mon worst case is acceptable. The higher write overhead also impacts the worst-case lifetime. SWL’s worst-case life-
time at 6 months is lower but acceptable assuming that the attack would be detected in that time (SWL can be used
for such detection).
Our numbers for SR are lower than those reported by Security
Refresh because of some differences in the metrics and configura-
tions. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the swaps extend the lifetime
by delaying program writes. While Security Refresh includes such
extension in the lifetime we do not because such extensions are not available to the application. Also, Security
Refresh uses 1-GB banks and 256-byte blocks in the second level whereas we use 512-MB banks and 512-byte
blocks which makes ournumFrames,and hence the absolute lifetime values, smaller by a factor of four. In the oppo-
site direction, Security Refresh assumes a write latency of 450 ns whereas we assume a longer 660 ns which makes
our absolute lifetimes longer by about a third. Thus there is a difference of a factor of 4/1.3 and 4/1,3 * 25 months
(our two-level SR lifetime) = 77 months which is close to what Security Refresh reports. We note that increasing
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numFramesvia larger regions and smaller blocks can help SWL without hurting SWL’s common-case write over-
head due tosampleOverwriteRate.
6  Conclusion
To address PCM’s wear out problem, previous papers have proposed periodic randomization of the address-to-
frame mapping in a memory region. To guarantee reasonable worst-case lifetimes, the papers assume that every write
overwrites the same memory block and incur either high write overhead due to for normal applications (i.e., the com-
mon case), or permanent, high hardware overhead (i.e., in all cases). We made the key observation that the overwrite
rates of normal applications (i.e., common case) are orders-of-magnitude lower than that of the worst case. Based on
this observation, we applied basic statistical sampling to estimate accurately the overwrite rate while requiring a
small sample buffer. We proposedstatistical wear leveling (SWL)which randomizes address-to-frame mapping on
the basis of the estimated overwrite rates instead of write rates.
SWL achieves both lower common-case write overhead and lower hardware overhead, and similar, high common-
case lifetime as compared to the previous schemes while achieving reasonable worst-case lifetime. By reducing the
common-case write overhead, SWL shields applications from the performance tax of wear leveling. By reducing the
permanent hardware overhead, SWL provides scalable wear leveling as PCM scales over technology generations.
In addition to the proposed scheme, SWL may also be used to detect anomalous write behavior by errant applica-
tions. Further, our statistical approach may be applicable to other areas of computer architecture, such as perfor-
mance monitoring. Our sample buffer could be configured to detect performance pathologies in the memory system.
We will explore these possibilities in future work.
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